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Together with other members of the European Union, France and Germany
are about to embark on an unprecedented cooperative venture. To be
successful, Economic and Monetary Union will require a very high degree of
mutual understanding among the policymakers of the participating countries.
It will also require upgrading the dialogue between those who contribute to
shaping the policy debates on both sides of the Rhine.
France and Germany have a long tradition of high-level dialogue and
cooperation in the framework of bilateral and European institutions. But
the dialogue between their civil societies does not match this spirit of
cooperation. Economists and those involved in practical economic policy
makink from both countries in particular rarely talk to each other to find
out why they may have differing visions of the functioning of Economic and
Monetary Union and of the associated challenges, and even more rarely try
to narrow the divergence of their views. This lack of dialogue contributes
to keeping alive entrenched prejudices on the other country`s supposedly
hidden policy agenda.
Yet, an Economic and Monetary Union in which policy debates with a
bearing on European policy choices remain confined within national
boundaries would be prone to instability, because disagreements about
policies would tend to end up in disputes between countries. It is,
therefore, of utmost importance to foster the emergence of a genuine
European professional discussion on major economic policy issues.
The purpose of the Deutsch-Französisches Wirtschaftspolitisches
Forum/ Forum économique franco-allemand is to contribute to this discussion
through the organisation of a series of informal meetings between French
and German economists.
The Forum assembles professional economists from academia, business
and the public sector. As a non-partisan institution, the Forum brings
together participants from all strands of thinking about economic policy
with the aim of stimulating fruitful debate. Each meeting is devoted to one
or two major policy issues: employment, exchange rate policies,  the
organisation of economic policy in Economic and Monetary Union, its
relations with non-participating countries, and the immediate policy
challenges on the eve of monetary union, to name just a few. The Forum
commissions papers to provide an informed basis for the discussion, but the
focus will be on debate and the exchange of views, starting with reactions
from discussants whose role will be to present alternative views and to
frame the key issues for the debate. 
The proceedings of each meeting are published in working paper
format. With the present brochure, we present papers of the discussion from
the Forum’s ninth meeting on June 25/26 2001 in Paris. We hope that this will be a
useful input into an emerging public debate on Europe’s economic policies
in our two countries and beyond.   
Jürgen von Hagen
Jean Pisani-




When it was established in the 1950's, the European Community was based on a global balance of power
among member States. That initial vision of the founding fathers of the European Union has been embodied
in the weighted voting system of the EU Council. Since its origin, this voting system has remained largely
unchanged, despite several enlargements. The scale of the member States' relative voting weights in the
EU-6 of 1957 is about the same as that of the EU-15 of 2000. For several decades, voting rights of the large
member States (France, Germany, Italy, and the United-Kingdom) have been 5 times higher than that of
Luxembourg, the smallest member. When enlargement occurred, new member States were granted
weighted votes according to their relative sizes, without any modification to the existing system or to the
relative voting rights of the other members. Only once, was the initial voting system adapted because of
enlargement, in 1973. However, even in that case, the same balance of power was essentially maintained.
The adaptation of the voting system was nominal in nature. This nominal increase of all voting rights of
member States was designed to allow better differentiation among medium-size countries (e.g. between
Belgium and Ireland) otherwise impossible.  
                                                          
1 An extended French version of this paper has been prepared for the Revue Française d'Economie (octobre
2001) and was presented at the 50
th Congress of the Association Française de Sciences Economiques, on
September 21, 2001. 
2 Ministère de l'Economie, des Finances et de l'Industrie (frederic.bobay@industrie.gouv.fr).1958 1973 1981 1986 1995
UE-6 UE-9 UE-10 UE-12 UE-15
France 4        10      10      10      10     
Germany 4        10      10      10      10     
Italy 4        10      10      10      10     
Belgium 2        5        5        5        5       
Netherlands 2        5        5        5        5       
Luxembourg 1        2        2        2        2       
United-Kingdom 10      10      10      10     
Ireland 3        3        3        3       
Denmark 3        3        3        3       
Greece 5        5        5       
Spain 8        8       
Portugal 5        5       
Sweden 4       
Austria 4       
Finland 3       
Total 17      58      63      76      87     
QMT 12      41      45      54      62     
QMT (%) 70.6 70.7 71.4 71.1 71.3
        Note: "QMT" is the qualified majority threshold.
However, besides the apparent stability of the nominal voting system, EU
enlargements have progressively shifted the initial balance of power to the advantage of
small member States and to the detriment of the large members. Over time, at each
enlargement, the share of the overall votes of the large member States tended to shrink
significantly in comparison to the overall votes of smaller members. This is a
consequence of the structure of enlargement, which have mostly encompassed small
States. The increasing number of small States relative to large States implied a shift in the
global power balance. Moreover, the resulting imbalance between large and small States
constitutes a challenge to the democratic character of the EU and to the legitimacy of
community decisions. 
This challenge is reinforced by the prospect of further enlarging the EU to 12 new
members, of which most are small States. EU enlargements to 27 member States is bound
to deteriorate further the political balance among members States within the Council. It
also affects the overall democratic character of the EU decision system. Without change
in the current voting system, EU collective decisions could be made with less and less
population representativity. The European Commission noted in that respect that Council
decisions should be sufficiently representative of the EU population through the member
States voting system. The minimal population represented in the votes has already
decreased from 68% to 58% when the EU enlarged from six members to fifteen. Without
adjustment of the voting system, enlarging the Union to EU-27 could bring this
population representation close to or below 50%. In such cases, legitimacy of EU
decisions would be questionable.QM in % of UE-6 UE-9 UE-10 UE-12 UE-15 UE-27a UE-27b
EU population 67.7      70.6      70.1      63.3      58.2      50.2      46.4     
Note: These are the minimal population required for a qualified majority decision. The UE-27
is calculated on the basis of the current weighted voting system, with a QMT of 70,90 % of the
votes (UE-27a) or 70,15% (UE-27b). Sources: European Commission (2000).
Thus, the need to increase the nominal voting rights of large member States has
progressively been felt in order to compensate for a growing democratic deficit within the
EU Council. With this goal in mind, EU member States reached in Nice an agreement to
reform the voting system of the EU Council.
I. Historical foundation of the weighted voting system in the European Union
Council
Historically, when the initial negotiations took place to establish the European
Economic Community in the 1950's, the power balance between large and small States
was a critical issue. At this occasion, the six founding member States agreed on a set of
guiding principles to define the Council decision voting system.
3
A first principle was to reject any objective criteria as the basis for establishing
voting rights. Such objective criteria, like relative economic weight, population or
contribution to the Community budget, were considered inadequate not just for technical
reasons, but mostly for far reaching political considerations. Recognizing the political
nature of the European Community project, it was considered justified to search for a
functional political equilibrium rather than to depend on contingent objective
circumstances.
A second principle was based on a pragmatic approach. The empirical success of
the weighted voting system of the existing Council of the Coal and Steel European
Community compared very positively to the poor practical functioning of the One
State/One vote rule (such as in the United Nations Organization). The very significant
differences in weight between member States could not be artificially nullified by the
Community institutions without implying serious dysfunctional risks. It then followed
that the Community decision framework had to be based on a weighted voting system. 
On the basis of these global orientations, specifying the exact weights of the
respective votes and the decision-making rules happened to be a difficult process with
intense negotiations between the six founding members. The negotiators' wish to
equitably allocate power among them created a difficulty that was not arithmetic but
political in nature. The main question was not to decide how much voting rights each
member State would be endowed with, but to define which groups of countries should be
able to block Community decisions. From that fundamental political decision would then
be derived the actual arithmetic of the respective voting rights and the qualified majority
threshold.
                                                          
3 For a detailed historical analysis of treaty negotiations, see de l’Écotais (1996a, 1996b, 1996c).Founding countries agreed that a blocking minority would be attained by the
coalition of a large member (France, Germany, or Italy) with a small one (Belgium or the
Netherlands), while the coalition of a large member with only a very small one
(Luxembourg) was considered insufficient to block a decision. From that agreement
could be identified the respective voting rights and the majority threshold. However, that
agreement did not end the difficulty that had emerged between large and small members.
The latter were concerned that their interests would not be sufficiently taken into account
in future Community decisions. A compromised was finally found on the basis of that
voting rights agreement by specifying the role of the European Commission: the Council
would take decisions under this weighted votes system (i.e. qualified majority) only in
the cases of a proposal from the Commission. For small member States, granting this
power to the Commission was a safeguard that the Community's interest would be
protected even when they would be out-voted in the Council. With this compromise on
the Commission involvement rule, the initial voting rights agreement became a defining
basis for the Community institutional system.
II. The EU Council voting system in the Nice Treaty 
The Nice Treaty establishes new modalities for the EU Council decision system.
The new system is for implementation on January 1, 2005, regardless of whether new
members would have by then joined the EU or not. It includes three major changes
compared to the current system:
(i)  New weighting of the respective voting rights.
(ii)  An increase in the qualified majority threshold from the current 71% to
nearly 74% for the EU-27, with a 73.4% ceiling for all the transition rates
that remain to be specified along the enlargement process. 
(iii)  The addition of two supplementary decision criteria: the simple majority
of member States and 62% of the EU population.
A careful analysis of the EU Council reform shows that the first change (i) is very
satisfactory since it actually resolves the enlargement institutional challenge. On the
contrary, the two others (ii) and (iii) introduce elements of regression in the Community
system.
In accordance with the goal of the 2000 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), the
new weighting of the member States' voting rights significantly increases the role of the
large members within the Council. The Nice Treaty gives large member States almost 10
times more voting rights than the smallest member. In comparison, large members would
only have five times more voting rights than the smallest country if the current system
were applied to the EU-27.  
This new balance between the large and small member States is slightly less
significant when measured in percentages of the total voting rights. The voting shares of
large member States' voting shares will only increase from 7.5% to 8.4%. On this basis,
the countries that benefit the most from the reform are Spain and Poland: their voting
rights will increase from 6.0% to 7.8%.The new weighted votes allocation in the EU Council for EU-27
UE-27 Current Nice Current Nice Impact of  Current Nice
system Treaty system Treaty reform system Treaty
Germany 10 29 7.5 8.4 0.9 5.0 9.7
France 10 29 7.5 8.4 0.9 5.0 9.7
United-Kingdom 10 29 7.5 8.4 0.9 5.0 9.7
Italy 10 29 7.5 8.4 0.9 5.0 9.7
Spain 8 27 6.0 7.8 1.9 4.0 9.0
Poland 8 27 6.0 7.8 1.9 4.0 9.0
Romania 6 14 4.5 4.1 -0.4 3.0 4.7
Netherlands 5 13 3.7 3.8 0.0 2.5 4.3
Greece 5 12 3.7 3.5 -0.3 2.5 4.0
Czech Rep. 5 12 3.7 3.5 -0.3 2.5 4.0
Belgium 5 12 3.7 3.5 -0.3 2.5 4.0
Hungary 5 12 3.7 3.5 -0.3 2.5 4.0
Portugal 5 12 3.7 3.5 -0.3 2.5 4.0
Sweden 4 10 3.0 2.9 -0.1 2.0 3.3
Bulgaria 4 10 3.0 2.9 -0.1 2.0 3.3
Austria 4 10 3.0 2.9 -0.1 2.0 3.3
Slovakia 3 7 2.2 2.0 -0.2 1.5 2.3
Denemark 3 7 2.2 2.0 -0.2 1.5 2.3
Finland 3 7 2.2 2.0 -0.2 1.5 2.3
Ireland 3 7 2.2 2.0 -0.2 1.5 2.3
Lithuania 3 7 2.2 2.0 -0.2 1.5 2.3
Latvia 3 4 2.2 1.2 -1.1 1.5 1.3
Slovenia 3 4 2.2 1.2 -1.1 1.5 1.3
Estonia 3 4 2.2 1.2 -1.1 1.5 1.3
Cyprus 2 4 1.5 1.2 -0.3 1.0 1.3
Luxembourg 2 4 1.5 1.2 -0.3 1.0 1.3
Malta 2 3 1.5 0.9 -0.6 11
TOTAL 134 345 100 100 0
Voting rights Percentage of total Gap to the smallest
Note: The last column shows the allocation of vote when compared to the smallest member
(i.e. expressed as the number of times the vote of the smallest member).
The importance of the reform is confirmed by other types of measurements, such
as allocation indicators (e.g. Gini index), which show that the new weighting system does
compensate for the effect of enlargement on the voting system balance. In that respect,
the overall goal of the Nice negotiation regarding the EU Council reform is fully
achieved.
On the contrary, the increase in the qualified majority threshold (QMT)
constitutes a weakness in the Council reform decided in Nice: EU decisions will be more
difficult to reach. Traditionally, this threshold has been established at about 71% of the
voting rights since the creation of the European Community. In the EU-27, it will be at
almost 74%, and this higher level creates many more possibilities for the formation of
blocking coalitions. Depending on the course of future enlargements, QMT may take different values
over time. The Nice Treaty defines three different cases in that respect: EU-15, EU-27,
and a transition phase from EU-16 to EU-26.
-  In the case of EU-15, i.e. in the hypothesis that no enlargement has occurred as of
January 1, 2005, QMT is established at 169 votes of a total of 237, or 71.3%
-  In the case of EU-27, the total number of votes is 345 and the treaty defines the
blocking minority at 91 votes. This means a QMT of 255
4 votes, or 73.9%.
-  In the case of enlargement from EU-16 to EU-26, the treaty is less specific. At the
occasion of each enlargement, ad hoc adjustments in the QMT percentages are likely
to be negotiated, in order to evolve progressively from the current 71% to the planned
73.9% of the EU-27. In any case, the Nice Treaty prevents the QMT to be higher than
a 73.4% ceiling during the transition period.
The Nice Treaty adds two new decision criteria to the existing weighted voting
system: a simple majority of member States and a minimum of 62% of the EU
population. In the new system, a decision is adopted if the member States supporting the
proposal represent at least the threshold of weighted votes, half of the total number of
members, and 62% of the EU population
5.
                                                          
4 This rule of a 91 votes blocking minority overrides the other indication in the treaty that the QMT is
established at 258 votes in EU-27. 
5 However, a few issues that are decided under the qualified majority rule by the EU Council won't be
subject to the two new criteria for technical and legal reasons. For those issues, characterized by ad hoc
definitions of the decision rule in the treaties, only weighted votes will be used for decision by the Council.
They include: monetary policy and the euro (cf. TEC, article 122, §5), sanctions against a member State not
respecting fundamental rights (cf. TEU, article 7, §4), some aspects of police and judicial cooperation in
criminal matters (cf. TEC, article 34, §3), and closer cooperation (cf. Nice Treaty, articles 27 E and 40 B).Three criteria for the EU Council decision-making
UE-27 voting voting simple share of
rights rights majority population
Threshold (%) 71 74 50 62
Threshold 96 255 14 620
Germany 10 29 1 169
France 10 29 1 123
United-Kingdom 10 29 1 123
Italy 10 29 1 120
Spain 8 27 1 82
Poland 8 27 1 80
Romania 6 14 1 47
Netherlands 5 13 1 33
Greece 5 12 1 22
Czech Rep. 5 12 1 21
Belgium 5 12 1 21
Hungary 5 12 1 21
Portugal 5 12 1 21
Sweden 4 10 1 18
Bulgaria 4 10 1 17
Austria 4 10 1 17
Slovakia 3 7 1 11
Denmark 3 7 1 11
Finland 3 7 1 11
Ireland 3 7 1 8
Lituania 3 7 1 8
Latvia 3 4 1 5
Slovenia 3 4 1 4
Estonia 3 4 1 3
Cyprus 2 4 1 2
Luxembourg 2 4 1 1
Malta 2 3 1 1
TOTAL 134 345 27 1000
It may seem that the two new criteria will have important implications for the
decision-making system and for the power balance between member States. This is not
the case however. In an enlarged EU, Council decisions will actually be made almost
exclusively on the basis of weighted votes, while the two new criteria will be mostly
purposeless.
In the EU-27, when a coalition of member States reaches a total of 255 voting
rights, the weighted votes threshold, it automatically has the required 14 members and
62% of the EU population in almost all cases. A very limited number of cases are
exception to this general rule. This can be demonstrated by a simple analysis of winning
coalitions (i.e. any combination of member States vote totaling the QMT). Among all the
potential wining coalitions on the basis of weighted votes, only 16 different coalitions are
affected by the simple majority criteria
6 and only 7 are affected by the population
                                                          
6 This can be demonstrated by a simple calculation. To measure the effect of the simple majority criteria on
the system, one must first identify the wining coalitions (on the basis of the weighted votes) which has the
smallest number of members, i.e. the wining coalition composed of the biggest members (from Germany to
Portugal, in descending order). This wining coalition has only 13 members and is a case where the simple
majority criteria does play a role: it turns this winning coalition into a loosing one. Identifying the secondcriteria
7. Compared with the total of about 3 million potential wining coalitions, the
impact of the two new criteria is completely insignificant and bears no implication on the
power balance. The effect of the two new criteria on the reweighted voting system is less
than 0.001% in the EU-27 (share of the winning coalitions affected by either of the two
new criteria in the total of winning coalitions).
As a consequence, the two new criteria have overall a negative impact because
they introduce a higher complexity in the Council decision-making system. They also
generate a lower transparency for the European citizens. For them, it will appear that the
three criteria have the same political importance, while only the weighted voting system
will really constitute the basis for coalition formations.
III. A game theory analysis of the Nice reform.
Game theory provides an analytical framework to identify EU member States'
relative power and to measure precisely the implications of the Nice reform. A member
States power is defined here as its capacity to affect EU Council decisions and not merely
to affect Council votes. In this perspective, when a member State's vote does not affect
the decision, it is not considered an expression of its relative power. To estimate how
member States' votes affect decisions, a power index can be computed, as is extensively
described in the cooperative game theory literature. 
For the current analysis, we use the Banzhaf index, as is most common in the
literature. The Banzhaf index measures member States' capacity to generate wining
coalitions in the Council: it estimates the relative capacity of member States to transform
losing coalition into winning ones by joining it. The Banzhaf index is preferred here to
the other most common index, the Shapley-Shubick index, because it does not take into
account the order of the votes. The order in which the votes are made is considered
irrelevant in the case of the EU Council, considering the practical functioning of Council.
Informal exchange of views always take place among members States before formally
taking stand in voting situations.
The new power balance
On the basis of Banzhaf index measurements, we present quantitative evidences
that the reformed weighted voting rights compensate the power shift among member
States resulting from enlargement to EU-27. Large member States' influence is
significantly enhanced and stabilized, as intended. This can be shown in comparing the
                                                                                                                                                                            
biggest wining coalition shows that it also has only 13 members, as well as a few other of the biggest
wining coalitions. Then, when one gets to the coalition that includes from Germany to the Netherlands, plus
4 of the 5 members with 12 votes, plus 2 of 3 members with 10 votes, this winning coalitions has 14
members and is not affected by the simple majority criteria. It can then be shown that any other wining
coalition will necessary have 14 members or more and, thus, will not be affected by the new criteria. 
7 The same kind of demonstration can be made with respect to the population criteria. In that case, one has
to start from the smallest winning coalition (the coalition formed with the smallest member States).
However, this result may be subject to variations in the coming years depending on the relative
demographic evolution of member States (a population forecast is presented in the annex).Banzhaf indexes for both the Nice Treaty voting system and the current system applied to
UE-27.
Power allocation among member States
Comparison between the current system and the Nice Treaty for EU-27








































































































Furthermore, the Banzhaf index can be used to compare the Nice Treaty voting
system to the five other reform scenarios officially considered at the Nice IGC. This
comparison shows that the Nice Treaty system performs as well as the second best
scenario of the official five. 
From the same analytical framework, we can also measure the impact of the
increased qualified majority threshold on the EU Council decision system. Increasing the
QMT implies that the collective decision capacity of the EU Council will likely be
reduced. This is due to the fact that more countries will be able to block EU decisions in
more voting situations when the QMT is higher. This can be measured with an index that
represents the collective capacity of the Council to take a decision. This index is
computed as the number of winning coalitions compared to the total number of coalitions(winning and loosing). Under the current voting system, 2.4% of the coalitions are
winning coalitions in the EU-27. This index drops to 2.0% with the Nice Treaty reform
applied to EU-27. This reduction in the collective decision capacity of the EU results
directly from the QMT difference (71% for the current system compared to 73.9% for the
Nice Treaty). This reduction is certainly a drawback for the EU, but its effect remains
limited in importance. 
The dangers of the dual simple majority system
One of the official scenarios considered during the IGC is the dual simple majority
system (DSM), which combines a simple majority of member States with a simple
majority of EU population. This proposal received support from some countries because
of some of its features. Especially, simplicity and transparency of the decision-making
have been regarded as relevant advantages of this system. 
However, game theory analysis shows major and unexpected downsides of this
scenario. The DSM would have three significant negative consequences on the EU
decision system. None of these important problems of the DMS have been explicitly
address or even presented in the public debate on the EU Council reform.
a)  It can be shown that the DSM increases the power of the large member States and that
of the smallest members as well, to the detriment of medium-size members. This
peculiar effect on the power balance of the EU Council is the result of the internal
working of the DSM: large countries benefit from the "simple majority of population"
side of the DSM and smallest countries benefit from the "simple majority of States"
side of the DSM, while medium-size countries benefit from neither. This shift in the
power balance was not justifiable vis-à-vis medium-sized countries, nor was it
legitimate or in accordance with the goal of the IGC (to increase the influence of the
large members to compensate the effects of enlargements).
b)  In the case of the DSM, the decision threshold is reduced from 71% to 50% (for both
decision criteria), which sharply facilitates the collective decision capacities of the
Council. This has two major political consequences. First, the higher easiness of the
Council to adopt the Commission's proposal reduces the member States' incentives to
work on compromises when disagreements occur among themselves. This situation is
then likely to lead to permanent conflict within the Council. Second, the traditional
institutional equilibrium between the Commission and the Council is deeply
modified, with a very significant shift of power from the Council to the Commission.
The Commission would overpower the Council because it would be in a position to
fully design all Community decision without much opposition from the Council: most
Commission's proposals are unlikely to be rejected by the Council, even when many
member States oppose them (in comparison to the current equilibrium).
c)  On the long term, under the hypothesis of Turkey joining the EU, the DSM would
have the consequence of alienating Community decision to the dominant influence ofTurkey. With its sharp demographic growth (100 million inhabitants in 2050
8),
Turkey would automatically be placed as a dominant player in the EU Council, since
it would directly benefit from the "simple majority of population" side of the DSM.
Turkey would have a very high capacity to form blocking minorities.
Sub-game among large member States on the parity issue
The game theory analysis also suggests some explanations for the IGC negotiation
structure and provides some insights on the underlying reasons leading to the shaping of
the Nice agreement. 
The IGC can be formalized as a global game among the 15 member States. That
global game is structured primarily as a game between two groups with divergent
interests, respectively the large and the small member States. Besides the global game, a
sub-game with fewer players is another driving force in the IGC negotiations. In this sub-
                                                          
8 UNO estimate, cf. annex.
Pondération actuelle et système de double majorité simple



























































































































































































































































Simple en 2050game, only the largest members fully took part, with divergent interests. The focus of the
players in this sub-game was the parity issue and their respective capacity to form
blocking coalitions in an enlarged EU. Spain and Germany in particular have been active
players in this sub-game. 
The request from Spain to obtain a blocking power in parity with the four large
members (France, Germany, United-Kingdom, and Italy) is the main driving force behind
the high qualified majority threshold in the Nice Treaty. The new weighted vote
allocation gives 27 votes to Spain (and Poland) and 29 votes to the four large members.
This two-vote difference, combined with a high QMT establishes a quasi-parity of power
between these six countries. They are in a quasi-parity since they almost
9 have the same
capacity to form a blocking minority: any coalition of 3 of the larger members (among
any of the 4 large members or Spain or Poland), plus any one additional smaller country,
including the smallest.
Another offensive player in the sub-game was Germany with its undertakings to
gain a breakup of parity with the rest of the large members (France, United-Kingdom,
and Italy). This is the underlying reason behind the addition of the population criteria in
the Council decision-making system. Furthermore, since this supplementary criteria was
not convergent with the interests of small member States, this addition in turn affected
the equilibrium in the global game, and gave further ground to the small members'
request for the addition of the criteria of simple majority of member States.
The German government's aim at breaking the traditional parity among large
member States is neither in line with the Community heritage, nor with today's German
democratic system.
Parity among large member States is a fundamental base of European integration.
It is a founding principle of the Community, established at the very origin of the initial
agreement creating the European Community. In its Mémoires, Jean Monnet describes in
details this founding agreement:  
-  "I [Jean Monnet] am authorized to propose you [Konrad Adenauer] that the
relationship between Germany and France within the Community be governed
by the parity principle in the Council, as well as in the Assembly and in all
European institutions, current or future, whether France's participation includes
or not the Union française [i.e. overseas territories] and whether Germany be
that of the West or reunified. I would personally add that it is in this spirit that,
since the beginning, I have considered the offer of union at the origin of this
treaty, and I believe I understood during our first meeting that you had the same
view."
                                                          
9 During the Nice negotiations, Spain supported that the QMT be defined on the basis of a 88 votes
blocking minority threshold. This would have granted Spain parity vis-à-vis large member States (without
taking into account the population criteria). However, for EU-27, this would have meant a QMT of nearly
75%, much higher than the current 71%, and it was eventually agreed that the blocking minority would be
established at 91 votes instead. That reduces the relative capacity of Spain to form blocking minority, as
compared to the four large member States. -  "I [Konrad Adenauer] am happy to give you my full agreement to your proposal,
because I don't conceive the Community without total parity[…]"
10  
The reason behind the parity principle rests on a consciousness of European history.
Over centuries, the temptations for one or another large European country to dominate
Europe have been the cause of many wars. European States' domination intentions, or the
fear of the threat of domination from a neighbor, have been strong incentives to build
heavy armaments and to wedge war against one-another. In that perspective,
institutionalizing parity between large European States is a way to dismantle this
incentive. The parity principle makes impossible any domination attempt. Parity further
serves as an insurance against domination risks, and thus creates the conditions for
building mutual trust, both between States and between populations, which is a recurrent
necessity for political integration. 
The parity principle is also at the heart of the German federal system itself. In the
Bundesrat, the institution where the government of the Länder are represented, weighted
voting rights are allocated to groups of Länder, in a parity system of group of Länder
(just as in the EU Council). The four large Länder have each the same number of votes,
despite a very significant gap between their respective population, the largest having
more than twice the population of the smallest of the group, a far bigger difference than
that among the four large EU member States.
Democratic representativity in the EU Council and in the German Bundesrat
Germany Voting rights
Large Länder in the Bundesrat M inhabitants Percentage Index
North Rhine-Westphalia 6 17,975         37                229
Bavaria 6 12,066         25                154
Baden-Württemberg 6 10,397         22                133
Lower Saxony 6 7,845           16                100
48,283         100              (Lower-Sx=100)
EU Voting rights
Large Member States in the EU Council M inhabitants Percentage Index
Germany 29 82,038         32                142
France 29 60,186         23                104
United-Kingdom 29 59,247         23                103
Italy 29 57,612         22                100
259,083       100              (Italy=100)
Population
Population
Sources: European Commission; Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistical Yearbook, 1999.
This parity among the four large EU member States will remain an essential
component of the functioning of the future EU Council, since the new criteria of
population (and simple majority) will hardly have any influence on the decision-making
system. Overall, in the future EU-27, only one case of a winning coalition formation will
be affected in a way to create an asymmetry between Germany and the other 3 large
                                                          
10 Meeting between Jean Monnet and Konrad Adenauer on April 4, 1951, in Bonn, for the preparation of
the European Coal and Steel Community treaty. Jean Monnet, Mémoires, Fayard, 1976, pp. 414-415. member States. This is one case of suspension of parity in a total of about 3 millions of
winning coalitions, where parity remains the rule. 
For the coming EU-27, the Nice Treaty will generate a new European power
balance. First, the increased influence of large member States will fully compensates the
effect of EU enlargement to many small States with collective over-sized power, and thus
the new weighted voting system does resolve the democratic challenge generated by
enlargement. Second, two medium size countries, Spain and Poland, will emerge with an
influence very close to that of the four large members. Third, taking into account the lack
of effect of the two new decision criteria, the prevailing parity among the four large
member States will remain a feature of the EU Council decision-making process. Bibliography
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Population of European States: évolution 1999-2050
In thousands and in comparison to (France = 100)
Countries
Thousands F=100 Thousands F=100 Thousands F=100
Belgium 10,213        17       10,017       16       8,918          15      
Denemark 5,313          9         5,283         8         4,793          8        
Germany 82,038        139     80,996       130     73,303        120    
Greece 10,533        18       10,141       16       8,233          14      
Spain 39,394        67       37,627       60       30,226        50      
France 58,966        100     62,495       100     60,941        100    
Ireland 3,744          6         4,302         7         4,710          8        
Italy 57,612        98       52,913       85       41,197        68      
Luxembourg 429             1         464            1         430             1        
Netherlands 15,760        27       15,876       25       14,156        23      
Austria 8,082          14       8,279         13       7,094          12      
Portugal 9,980          17       9,515         15       8,137          13      
Finland 5,160          9         5,266         8         4,898          8        
Sweden 8,854          15       9,099         15       8,661          14      
United-Kingdom 59,247        100     59,845       96       56,667        93      
Bulgaria 8,230          14       7,282         12       5,673          9        
Cyprus 752             1         886            1         913             1        
Estonia 1,446          2         1,170         2         927             2        
Hungary 10,092        17       9,167         15       7,488          12      
Latvia 2,439          4         1,999         3         1,628          3        
Lithuania 3,701          6         3,465         6         2,967          5        
Malta 379             1         427            1         421             1        
Poland 38,667        66       39,318       63       36,256        59      
Czech Rep. 10,290        17       9,743         16       7,829          13      
Romania 22,489        38       20,530       33       16,419        27      
Slovakia 5,393          9         5,446         9         4,836          8        
Slovenia 1,978          3         1,871         3         1,487          2        
Turquey 64,385        109     84,187       135     100,664      165    
Norway 4,465          8         4,777         8         4,758          8        
Switzerland 7,386          13       7,624         12       6,745          11      
Iceland 281             0         321            1         341             1        
Lichtenstein 31               0         31              0         31               0        
Albania 3,113          5         3,663         6         4,322          7        
Bosnia-Herzeg. 3,972          7         4,372         7         3,767          6        
Croatia 4,473          8         4,279         7         3,673          6        
Macedonia 2,024          3         2,226         4         2,302          4        
Yougoslavia 10,640        18       10,841       17       10,548        17      
1999 2020 2050
Sources : European Commission; UNO, World Population Prospect, 1998, (medium variant).The Future of European Agricultural Policies
Winfried von Urff
1.  Issues of the present debate
 
  The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union (the European Economic
Community at the time when it came into being) is a never-ending subject. On the one hand it
was a driving force in the process of integration - although this role is often over-estimated –
on the other hand it was a permanent source of conflict that sometimes brought the
Community at the edge of collapse. In an area as densely regulated as agriculture, conflicts of
national interests are quite natural. Underlying subjects were the level of protection and the
way in which protection takes place, both affecting the agricultural sectors of Member States
in a different way, production quotas, common subsidies, national subsidies etc. A major
source of conflict that unduly dominated the debate during the 1970s and the 1980 was the
system of Monetary Compensatory Amounts, strongly defended by Germany and attacked by
others. A permanent issue for Germany is the distribution of financial resources brought about
by the CAP in which Germany has the position of a net payer.
 
  At the core of the present debate about the CAP is the question, whether the actual problems
of BSE (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy) and FMD (Foot and Mouth Disease) should be
used for a fundamental reform, which is the official position of Germany, or whether more
targeted measures should be implemented to directly treat these problems with some revisions
but no fundamental change of the CAP, which seems to be the position of France. The
direction in which Germany wants to see a fundamental change in the agricultural policy can
be summarized as “greening“ in combination with more emphasis on consumer protection and
on employment  (more support for organic farming and less for large-scale production, high
food safety standards, support for labour demanding farming practices, more emphasis on
animal welfare) under the implicit assumption that there is a strong positive correlation
between the underlying objectives
1. One possible way to bring about the desired changes is
seen in re-assigning more responsibility to the national or to the regional level, simplified as
“re-nationalisation” of agricultural policy, another alternative being a change of the CAPtowards the new priorities (or a combination of both). From the German point of view “re-
nationalisation” would have the advantage of reducing Germany’s net-payer position.  France
is against “re-nationalisation” and questions the need for drastic changes before 2006, by
arguing that the CAP after the Agenda 2000 decisions offers sufficient possibilities to take
ecological and social aspects into account by “cross compliance” and  “modulation”
2. One
should, however, not forget that France is among the winners of the financial redistribution
resulting from the CAP in its present form and therefore will loose advantages if fundamental
changes take place.
 
  The following paper tries to analyse the chances and limitations of a re-allocation of
responsibilities in agricultural policy between the EU and Member States and to change the
content of agricultural policy in connection with such a re-allocation. This is done in the light
of the historical evolution of the CAP, with particular emphasis on the 1992 reform and the
Agenda 2000, taking into account the international framework set by the results of the
Uruguay-Round and the ongoing WTO negotiations as well as the requirements of the
eastward enlargement of the EU.
 
2.  Is re-nationalisation an option? - Lessons taught by history
 
  As a point of departure it may be helpful to go back in history to the time when the European
Economic Community was established. If preliminary considerations included the idea to
exempt agriculture from the Common Market such idea was dropped very soon, primarily for
two reasons. One reason was the impossibility to differentiate between agricultural and
industrial commodities. Food is mostly traded in processed form, i.e. as an industrial
commodity. It would have been completely unrealistic to have a common market that
included food but excluded the primary agricultural products used as raw material for food
commodities, thus allowing Member States to stabilise agricultural commodity prices at
different levels by national interventions. Another reason was the vital interest some of the
founding members had in a common market for agricultural products. Besides the
Netherlands, a major exporter of animal products, France had such an interest. The
agricultural sector played an important role within the French economy, making France to
expect a lot from unrestricted agricultural trade within the Community, whereas the French
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1 Bundesministerium für Verbraucherschutz, Ernährung und Landwirtschaft: Agrarbericht der Bundesregierung
2001.pp.9/10.industry felt threatened to be exposed to competition by the strong German industrial sector.
In Germany it was the other way round. Industrialists were looking forward to the common
market with great expectations, whereas farmers had the feeling of being sacrificed for the
sake of overall economic growth
3. Even at present one sometimes gets the impression that this
constellation still prevails in the minds of some of the actors.
 
  Given the situation just outlined it was quite logical that Art. 38 of the Treaty of Rome
(Art.32 after the revision of Amsterdam) clearly states that the Common Market includes
agriculture and trade in agricultural commodities. It continues by stipulating, that the creation
of the Common Market should go hand in hand with the introduction of a Common
Agricultural Policy. For other sectors of the economy common policies are not mentioned.
The special treatment of agriculture is due to the fact that in the national policies of all
founding members the agricultural sector was largely exempted from the market economy by
sophisticated systems of regulations and interventions, which gave national agricultural
policies a special role. The Treaty of Rome implied a continuation of such situation. Art.39
(now Art.33) defines the objectives of the CAP, i.e. (a) to increase agricultural productivity
by promoting technical progress and the optimal utilisation of the factors of production, (b)
thus to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, (c) to stabilise markets,
(d) to ensure the availability of supplies, and (e) to ensure that supplies reach consumers at
reasonable prices. With regard to market regulations three options were offered by Art.40
(now Art.34): (1) coordination of national market organisations, (2) common rules for
competition, and (3) common market organisations. Experience showed that for practical
reasons only option 3 was feasible, given the intensity and the complexity of market
interventions that already existed within the Member States.
 
  The Common Market Organisations, which form the core of the CAP were designed and
implemented between 1962 and 1969. They were built on three principles: (1) free movement
of goods within the Community, (2) preference for production within the Community against
imports, and (3) common financial responsibility. 
 
  In most of the market organisations prices (target prices) are fixed annually by the Council of
Ministers and to a large extent guaranteed to the producers by an intervention mechanism.
                                                                                                                                                        
 
2 See Agra-Europe 17/01, Europa-Nachrichten, pp.10/11.Quantities that are not absorbed by the market can be sold to intervention offices at
intervention prices that are also fixed annually by the Council of Ministers. During the last
decade the mechanism, that formerly offered a complete price guarantee to the producers, was
modified by making intervention purchases dependent on the condition that the market price
dropped below a specified level and by lowering the prices paid for interventions below the
official intervention prices. In the market organisation for sugar the price guarantee was
limited to specific quotas from the beginning, in the market organisation for milk a similar
system was introduced in 1984. The intra community price level was protected against the
world market by variable levies, which as a result of the Uruguay-Round of the GATT were
converted into tariffs in 1995. In order to allow exports on the world market at prices below
the internal prices, export restitutions are paid, whose amount corresponds to the import
tariffs. Some of the market organisations, including those for poultry meat, pig meat and
several varieties of fruits and vegetables, do not include interventions or limit them to
extraordinary situations. For perishable commodities, which cannot be stored, quantities
purchased through intervention can either be processed (e.g. wine to alcohol, often not for
human consumption), distributed to charitable organisations or destroyed, which creates high
costs and problems of acceptance. Other market organisations like those for olives, tobacco,
durum wheat and (since the reform of 1992) oilseeds include direct payments as a means to
increase farm income putting the financial burden on the taxpayer instead of the consumer.
The same principle was applied in the common market organisations for hops, flax, cotton,
silk worms, and seeds, all products of minor general importance but for various reasons




  It seems self-evident that in a single market in which on the one hand the principle of free
movement of commodities is guaranteed, while producers are heavily protected against
outside competition and their income is largely influenced by price support and by direct
payments the options offered by Art. 40 (now Art. 34) other than common market
organisations are infeasible. This part of the CAP therefore does not allow re-nationalisation.
That past decisions of the Council of Ministers do not exclude reverting to the other options
                                                                                                                                                        
 
3 For a more detailed description see v.Urff, W.: Agrarmarkt und Struktur des ländlichen Raumes, in:
Weidenfeld, W. (Ed.): Europa-Handbuch, Bonn 1999. p.445.
 
4 v. Urff, W.: Agrarmarkt und Struktur des ländlichen Raumes,.........p.446.mentioned in Art.40 is true from a juridical point of view
5 but from a practical point of view it
seems impossible. Politicians who advocate for re-nationalisation of agricultural market and
price policy do not acknowledge the lessons taught by history.
 
 
3.  The principle of common financial responsibility – How to deal with its implications?
A question closely related to re-nationalisation is that of co-financing the expenditures
originating from the market and price policy. Parallel to the implementation of the common
market organisations the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) was
established in order to finance the costs originating from the market organisations. This is
completely done by the Guarantee Section of the EAGGF. The Guidance Section was
established in order to co-finance structural measures within the Member States. In the
beginning the EAGGF absorbed more than 70 p.c. of the EEC budget because there were no
other common policies leading to expenditures. In 2000 total expenditures of the EAGGF
were 45.5 billion Euro (40.4 billion for the Guarantee Section and 5.1 billion for the Guidance
Section), still 51 p.c. of the EU budget
6.
 Besides the importance of the total amount the distributional effect of the market and price
policy is the object of strong criticism. In 1999 an amount of 10.0 billion Euro of the
Guarantee Section originated in Germany whereas expenditures in Germany were only 5.7
billion Euro resulting thus in a German net contribution of 4.3 billion Euro. Other net payers
were the UK, the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, and Italy. Net
beneficiaries were Denmark, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Portugal and France
7. The main criticism
is that the distribution effects do not follow the principle that comparatively rich countries
support poor countries, but are accidental, sometimes benefiting rich countries with a strong
agricultural sector.    
                                                
 
5 Seidel, M.: Rückführung der Landwirtschaftspolitiken die Verantwortung der Mitgliedstaaten? Rechts- und
Verfassungsfragen des Gemeinschaftsrechts, Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung, Policy Paper B00-
17, Bonn 2000.
6 Bundesministerium für Verbraucherschutz, Ernährung und Landwirtschaft: Agrarbericht der Bundesregierung
2001, p.91.
7 Bundesministerium für Verbraucherschutz, Ernährung und Landwirtschaft: Agrarbericht der Bundesregierung
2001, Annex, p. 81.It is not surprising that most criticism comes from Germany. Following German requests in
the past several models were calculated and discussed within the political bodies but without
results. The general answer to the German plea for co-financing the market expenditure was
that the financial burden resulting from jointly decided policies has to be financed jointly.
Moreover one has to take into account that the incidence of expenditures of the market and
price policy is not as straightforward as they seem to be. If surpluses are withheld from the
market by interventions and thus prices stabilised, the beneficiaries are all farmers who
produce the respective commodity within the single market and not only those of the county
in which the intervention actually takes place. If surpluses are reduced by exports with the
help of export restitutions the beneficiaries are European farmers and not the country in which
the exporter resides.         
4. Changes brought about by past reforms
By the CAP reform of 1992, the so-called Mac Sharry reform, the level of price support for
major commodities was reduced (for cereals by 33 p.c., for beef by 15 p.c. over a period of
three years) and per hectare or headage payments introduced or increased in order to
compensate farmers for the income effects of price cuts. The compensation payments were
calculated in such a way that on average full compensation was achieved, except for beef
where upper limits for the number of animals per farm and for the stocking density were
introduced with the effect that farmers received premiums only for a part of the cattle they
kept for fattening
8. From a budgetary point of view the reform led to the result that the costs
for market interventions decreased from 95 p.c. of the total expenditure of the Guarantee
Section of the EAGGF to about 50 p.c. and the amount of direct payments increased from 3
p.c. to 45 p.c. the rest being expenditures for agri-environmental programs.
The shift from market interventions to direct payments will continue following the decisions
of the Agenda 2000. The negotiations and the tensions coming up within the process are
certainly still fresh in everybody’s memory
9. On the German side the net-payer position was
one of the issues, on the French side it was the wish to shield agriculture against too drastic
changes. The EU was under the pressure to honour the commitments of the Agreement on
                                                
8 Bulletin der EU 5 (1992) p.55.Agriculture of the Uruguay-Round and to prepare the ground for the WTO-negotiations
starting in November 1999. There was a general consensus to limit EU expenditures,
particularly those for the CAP and of the structural funds.  Decisions had to take into account
the requirements originating from the eastward enlargement of the EU. Fundamental
decisions were taken at the Berlin Summit of 24/25 March 1999 and later on converted into a
series of regulations by the Council of Ministers on 17 May 1999. 
Concerning the common market organisations it was decided to reduce the level of support
prices for cereals by 15 p.c. over two years and to increase the per hectare payment in a way
that compensates 50 p.c. of the income effect of price cuts. The per hectare payments for
oilseeds, which were about 35 p.c. higher than those for cereals, will be reduced to the same
level over a period of three years. For beef the level of support prices will be reduced by                                         
20 p.c. in three annual steps and the headage payments increased accordingly, but also in this
case  - except for suckler cows - full compensation will not be achieved even with the
inclusion of slaughter premiums which were introduced as a new element. The ceiling of 90
animals per farm was abolished. Its re-introduction is one of the issues presently debated. For
milk the quota system was extended until 2006. A further extension of the system will depend
on a mid-term review in 2003. The quotas were increased by specific amounts for Greece,
Spain, Ireland, and Italy and by 1.5 p.c. over a period of three years, for all other Member
States. Beginning in 2003/04 the support prices for milk will be reduced by 15 p.c. over a
period of four years and compensation payments based on the milk quota per farm will be
introduced and increased correspondingly. They will, however, compensate only 40 p.c. of
the effects of price cuts. Another 20 p.c. may be compensated by lump sum amounts put at the
disposal of the Member States who will be free to distribute them, as they consider
appropriate
10.
The increasing importance of direct payments in comparison to the costs of market
interventions has initiated a debate whether these payments could and should be co-financed
by the Member States, which Germany strongly advocates. The main argument is that in
contrast to market interventions these payments directly benefit farmers within the respective
Member Sates. It would therefore be fair – so the argument – to put part of the burden on the
                                                                                                                                                        
9 For a more detailed description see  v. Urff, W.: Agrar- und Fischereipolitik, in: Weidenfeld, W. /
Wessels,W.(Eds): Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 1998/1999, p.125-134.national budgets.  Among the German “Länder” Bavaria goes further by arguing that even the
amount of the compensation payments should be left to the decision of national or regional
authorities, allowing them thus to maintain small farms under unfavourable conditions if they
give high priority to traditional farm structure and are prepared to pay for it in addition to EU
payments.             
One may, however, have serious doubts whether such nationally co financed or national
payments are feasible from a juridical and a political point of view. Would it really be
possible that the Council of Ministers decides on the level of payments, which have partly to
be paid by the Member States? Most probably the answer is no
11. Would it be possible that
EU compensation payments are topped-up by national payments? Does this not imply a
violation of the principle that national subsidies, which may distort competition, are
forbidden? With the help of national payments more farms are kept in production than would
have been otherwise which makes economic survival more difficult for farms in other
Member States that do not grant additional payments from their own budget. 
Of fundamental interest are two possibilities introduced by the so-called “Horizontal
Regulation” as part of the Agenda 2000. Member States are permitted to reduce the level of
compensation payments for a farm if (1) the number of work units is lower than a certain
level, (2) farm income exceeds a certain level, or (3) the total amount of compensation
payments exceeds a certain amount (“modulation”). Member Sates also have the possibility to
link compensation payments to environmental standards and to reduce their level in
accordance with the degree of violation of these standards (“cross compliance”). The total
amount saved by modulation and cross compliance is available for agro-environmental
programs, which are nationally co-financed. Contrary to France and UK, Germany has so far
not yet used these possibilities but obviously the present Minister of Consumer Protection,
Food and Agriculture wants to make use of them as part of a new policy. Co-financing was a
problem not least because of the financial burden resulting from BSE and FMD but this
problem seems to be solved after an intervention of the German Chancellor.
5.Agri-environmental measures
                                                                                                                                                        
10 Deutscher Bauernverband: Situationsbericht 2000. pp.92-109.
11 Seidel, M.: Rückführung der Landwirtschaftspolitik in die Verantwortung der Mitgliedstaaten?.........    Agro-environmental measures are a more and more important element of the CAP. They are a
reaction to the fact that modern highly intensive farming may cause environmental damages
such as percolation of plant nutrients (primarily nitrate) and chemicals into the groundwater,
loss of natural and semi-natural habitats, loss of bio-diversity, erosion, soil compaction etc. At
the fist time the “Efficiency Regulation” of 1985 introduced the possibility for Member States
to pay premiums to farmers for environmentally friendly farming practices. They were
subjected to strict rules in order to prevent that they became national subsidies of a
competition distorting nature. Later on the Community decided to co finance such premiums.
In the context of the CAP reform of 1992 so-called “accompanying measures” were
introduced
consisting of agro-environmental measures, an early retirement scheme, and an afforestation
programme. All these measures are co-financed by the EU and Member States, normally on a
50 to 50 basis. Most important of them is Regulation 2078/92 concerning agricultural production
methods that are in line with environmental requirements and protect natural habitats. It stipulates
that programmes designed by member states and accepted by the Commission may include
granting premiums to farmers who on a voluntary and contractual basis undertake:
- to reduce substantially, or maintain a reduction, in the use of fertilisers and /or plant
protection products, or to adopt or continue with organic farming production methods;
- to change to, or maintain, more extensive forms of crop production, or to convert arable
land into extensive grassland;
- to reduce the stocking rate of sheep and cattle per forage hectare;
- to use other farming practices compatible with the protection of the environment and
natural resources, as well as the maintenance of the countryside and the landscape; 
- to rear animals of local breeds in danger of extinction or plants endangered by genetic
erosion;
- to maintain abandoned farmland or woodland for reasons of environmental protection;
- to set aside farmland for at least 20 years with a view to its use for purposes connected
with the environment, in particular for the establishment of biotope reserves or natural
parks for the protection of hydrological systems:
- to manage land for public access and leisure activities.
Farmers participating in the schemes are paid a compensation for the associated loss of income
plus an incentive, which should not exceed 25 p.c. of the premium. For each kind of activityupper limits for the premiums are defined by the Regulation. The premiums are paid on an annual
basis. The scheme requires that farmers commit themselves for a period of five years except for
the set-aside scheme, where the period is twenty years. The Regulation offered different forms for
implementing agro-environmental programmes, which were used by the Member Sates in
different ways.  
Taking into account the different ways in which the Member States made use of the opportunities
offered by Regulation 2078/92 it is no surprise to see large differences in the allocation of EU-
contributions between Member States. The lion's share went to Germany, followed by France,
Austria and Italy. Greece, Belgium and Denmark are countries whose share did not exceed 1 p.c.
By and large the programme was quite successful. It was largely accepted by farmers so that for
the period 1994-1999 the average annual amount spent out of the EU budget was nearly 0.9
billion ECU
12. The Agenda 2000 offers the possibility to continue agro-environmental schemes
along the same lines within a different institutional arrangement. Member States who want to
give more emphasis to environmental aspects have the opportunity to do so.
6. Structural Policies
Compared to the market and price policy structural policies receive less recognition in the public
debate, which – taking into account the real importance this part of the CAP has – is a wrong
perception. In the early years, i.e. from 1962 to 1972 the Common Agricultural Policy limited
itself to co-ordinating and supplementing national structural policies. In the light of the Mansholt
Plan of 1968 a more active approach to structural policies was adopted. The Community began to
co-finance certain measures of the Member States, provided they fulfilled certain conditions laid
down in common directives or regulations. Most of these measures aimed at structural
improvements in farming including small scale processing and marketing of farm products.
Horizontal measures applicable in all Member States, such as modernisation of farms, re-training
of farmers and retirement supports for older farmers were introduced by the so-called structural
directives  (Directives EEC 159 to 1961 of 1972). They were complemented in 1975 by the
Directive EEC 268/75 on mountain and hill farming and farming in less favoured areas
13. 
                                                
12 Schramek, J. / Biehl, D. / Buller, H. / Wilson, G. (Eds.): Implementation and Effectiveness of Agri-
environmental Schemes Established under Regulating 2078/92, Final Consolidated Report, Frankfurt, June
1999. 
13 v. Urff, W.: Agrarmarkt und Struktur des ländlichen Raumes,.........p.451.A fundamental change was brought about in 1988 by the decision laid down in Regulation (EEC)
2052/88 to bring together the three major structural policy instruments, the European Regional
Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), and the Guidance Section of the
EAGGF.  The resources made available to the structural funds were doubled in real terms from
seven billion ECU in 1989 to 14 billion ECU in 1993. For interventions of the structural funds the
following objectives were defined:
-  Objective 1: Promoting the development and structural adjustment of regions whose
development is lagging behind;
-  Objective 2: Converting the regions seriously affected by industrial decline;   
-  Objective 3: Combating long-term unemployment and facilitating the occupational
integration of young people and of persons threatened by exclusion from the labour
market;
- Objective 4: Facilitating the adjustment of working people to industrial changes and
changes of production systems;
-  Objective 5a: Speeding up the adjustment of agricultural structures to the reform of the
CAP, 
-  Objective 5b: Facilitating the development and structural adjustment of rural areas
14.
Three of the six objectives refer to agriculture itself or regions, where agriculture has an above
average economic and social weight. Objective 1 supports the development of - mainly - rural
areas, which substantially lag behind the Community's average gross domestic product per capita.
Regions eligible for objective 1-support were Greece, Ireland and Portugal in total, and Northern
Ireland large parts of Spain and southern Italy. In 1994 the new Länder of Germany (the former
German Democratic Republic) also became eligible for objective 1-support. Objective 5b
supported the development of rural areas, characterised by an above average proportion of people
employed in agriculture, a below average gross value added per labour unit in agriculture, and a
relatively low gross domestic product per capita. Objective 5a included the so-called "horizontal
structural measures“, i.e. all activities destined to facilitate and accelerate structural adjustments
in agriculture without regional limitation. Out of the total financial resources of 58.3 billion ECU
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Roles for Rural Areas, Hannover 1996, pp.65-70.provided for the Community's structural funds for the years 1989-93, more than 64 p.c. were
assigned to objective 1, about 6 p.c. to objective 5a and 5 p.c. to objective 5b
15.  
At the Edinburgh summit in December 1992 the European Council decided again a doubling of
the financial allocations to the structural funds that brought the average amount available per
annum from 13 billion ECU to 25 billion ECU for the period 1994-1999. Total allocation for that
period was 153 billion ECU (at 1994 prices). The objective structure remained unchanged and
the percentage amounts allocated to the various objectives by and large corresponded to those of
the previous period. Following the accession of Austria, Sweden, and Finland in 1995 a new
objective 6 was introduced providing support similar to that of objective 1 in certain areas in the
northern parts of the Scandinavian countries with extremely low population density.
 In the Agenda 2000 this policy was continued, however with smaller increases in the financial
allocations. The Berlin Summit did not follow the Commission’s proposal to allocate 275 billion
Euro to the structural funds for the years 2000 to 2006, which would have been 75 billion Euro
more than the amount of 200 billion Euro that was available for the period 1993 to 1999  (both at
1997 prices) but reduced that amount to 258 billion Euro. Out of that total an amount of 45 billion
Euro was earmarked for the accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe, leaving for the
EU-15 an amount of 213 billion Euro
16.
Following the Commission’s proposal the number of objectives was reduced from 7 to 3. Among
this three objective 1 remained more or less unchanged. The regions lagging behind in
development and thus facing most serious difficulties were given the same priority as in the past.
About two thirds of the total amount were allocated to this objective. In future, however, the
threshold of a per capita income of 75 p.c. of the Community average should be applied more
strictly. By this the population living in areas eligible for objective 1 will be reduced from 25 to
20 p.c..
The newly defined objective 2 „supporting the economic and social conversion of areas facing
structural difficulties“ brought together measures for other regions suffering from structural
problems. These are areas undergoing economic change (in industry or services), declining rural
areas, crisis-hit areas dependent on the fishing industry or urban areas in difficulty. The new
                                                
15 European Commission, Directorate-General for Agriculture: Rural Developments, CAP 2000, Working
Document, Brussels 1997.  programmes to support the objective 2 areas, to which 11 p.c. of the total financial means were
allocated, will favour economic diversification, particularly in regions heavily dependent on a
single economic sector. As compared with the previous objective 2 covering an area in which 16
p.c. of Europe’s population were living and objective 5b-regions with 9 p.c. of the population, the
new objective 2-regions will only comprise 18 p.c. of the population (5 p.c. within the rural
areas). A new objective 3 “supporting the adaptation and modernisation of education, training
and employment policies and systems” will be implemented horizontally.
 
Taking into account the impact of the changes in the Common Market Organisation on rural
areas and the increasing importance of environmental and recreational needs that would offer
new development opportunities from which farmers and their families should be able to benefit
the following reorganisation of the existing rural policy instruments was proposed by the
Commission
17:
-  Existing accompanying measures financed by the EAGGF, Guarantee Section should be
supplemented by the Less Favoured Areas scheme including its application in the
objective 1 regions and implemented horizontally in a decentralized way.
-  For those rural areas, which are located in objective 1 regions, the approach of integrated
development programmes should be maintained.
-  In rural areas eligible under the new objective 2, operations (formerly objectives 5a and
5b) will be financed by the EAGGF Guarantee Section as accompanying measures
together with measures of other structural funds within the same region.
-  In all rural areas outside objective 1 and the new objective 2, rural develop measures to
accompany and complement market policies will be co-financed by the EAGGF
Guarantee Section. They will embrace all types of measures supporting structural
adjustment and rural development as formerly co-financed by the EAGGF Guidance
Section. 
The Berlin Summit followed the Commission’s proposal and, based on that decision, the Council
of Ministers adopted on 17 May 1999 the Regulation No 1257/99 on Support for Rural
Development from the EAGGF, which is considered as the „second pillar“ of the CAP and to
which 30 billion Euro were allocated for the period 2000-2006 within the Guarantee Section of
the EAGGF. It includes the activities that were introduced as „accompanying measures“ by the
                                                                                                                                                        
16 EU-Kommission: „ Agenda 2000. Eine stärkere und erweiterte Union“, Bulletin der EU, Beilage 5, 1997.
17 EU-Kommission: “ Agenda 2000........1992 reform (i.e. agro-environmental schemes, early retirement, and afforestation), measures for
less favoured areas, adjustment of production and processing structures in agriculture and forestry
(former 5a-measures), development of rural areas (former 5b-measures) and a long list of new
measures including soil amelioration, consolidation of farms, marketing of quality products,
village renewal, improvement of living conditions in rural areas, protection and preservation of
rural heritage, diversification of agricultural and non-agricultural activities, improvement of rural
infrastructure, promotion of tourism and handicraft. The new regulation offers a broad spectrum
of activities out of which national and regional authorities can select and combine those that they
consider most appropriate to achieve their objectives of rural development and environmental
protection. Such rural development plans should include, amongst other things, a quantified
description of the current situation, the strategy proposed and indicators for evaluation in order to
allow transparency and democratic control. 
7. Why does the CAP have to continue to evolve?
The previous sections of this paper have shown a remarkable evolution of the CAP from a set of
market organisations to complex and comprehensive policy with increasing emphasis on
environmental aspects and on rural development. The question therefore arises whether the
heated debate about the future of the agricultural policy is justified and whether the CAP really
needs fundamental changes? Only if the answer to these questions is yes one can tackle the
question into which direction changes should go.
The reasons why changes in the CAP are needed are manifold
18. The following seem to be the
most important ones:
There is a continuing and perhaps even growing domestic dissatisfaction with the CAP.
Consumers are more and more concerned about food safety particularly after the incidence of
BSE and FMD. One may argue that from a scientific point of view never in history food has been
safer than at present but the perception of the public at large is completely the other way round.
There is the general suspicion that intensive production is itself a threat to food integrity and food
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Agricultural and Rural Policy for Europe, European Economy, Reports and Studies No. 5, 1997, p.6safety
19. Availability of food is taken for granted and food prices that are at a historically low
level are not a major issue in public awareness. That there are environmental problems caused by
agriculture is beyond dispute. There is a fundamental conflict between many systems of intensive
crop and animal production and many aspects of the environment. The impact of agro-
environmental measures is by far less than what environmentalists want to see. Animal welfare is
also a growing concern for many people mostly seen in connection with the number of animals
kept on a farm and the intensity of production. Farmers are frustrated because the CAP has
failed in achieving its aim of enabling farmers to earn an income that by and large reflects the
general income development and allows them a standard of living comparable to other groups of
the society. Moreover they feel discriminated by the visibility of the compensation payments and
discouraged by increasing restrictions on farming practices for environmental reasons. European
citizens, first of all politicians, are concerned about the high expenditures of the CAP, which –
despite the upper limit of 40.5 billion Euro per annum (at 1998 prices) imposed by the Berlin
Summit - still absorb 51 p.c. of the EU budget. Economists regret the misallocation of resources
resulting from distorted incentives and the low efficiency of the expenditures
20. Public
expenditures and transfers from consumers resulting from price support exceed the income effect
of policy measures for European farmers, primarily because of the low efficiency of export
subsidies, by which consumers in the countries that import EU surpluses are subsidised.
Efficiency of the CAP is also less than satisfactory with regard to the development of rural areas.
Many rural areas are still lagging behind in economic development despite high CAP
expenditures, due to the fact that these expenditures are not adequately geared to development
purposes but mainly distributed depending on the volume of production. It is largely felt that the
unsatisfactory results are related to a wrong allocation of responsibilities: too much centralisation
and too little responsibilities assigned to the national and the regional level.
A need for re-assessing the adequacy of the present CAP also results from the WTO negotiations.
In the Agreement on Agriculture of the Uruguay-Round the EU accepted (1) to reduce its internal
level of support by 20 p.c. as compared to 1986-88 over a period of six years, (2) to replace
variable import levies by tariffs and to reduce the level of protection by 36 p.c. within the same
period, (3) to reduce the amount of export subsidies by 36 p.c. and the quantities exported with
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20 Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten: Zur
Weiterentwicklung der EU-Agrarreform, Schriftenreihe des Bundesministeriums für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft
und Forsten, Reihe A: Angewandte Wissenschaft, Heft 459, Bonn 1997. the help of export restitutions by 21 p.c., (4) to open up a minimum access to the internal market
of 3 p.c. of domestic demand at the beginning, increasing to 5 p.c. at the end of the transition
period, (5) to subject its area under oilseeds to a ceiling of 5.128 million hectares
21. It is only now
at the end of the transition period that some of the restrictions start to become binding. The EU
must, however, be aware of the necessity to honour these commitments in the future, which may
require additional actions to prevent production from increasing beyond levels in line with
exports within the agreed limits
22. 
Part of the Agreement on Agriculture was the decision to start new negotiations early enough
before the end of the so-called peace clause at the end of 2003 in order to reach an agreement for
the following period. These negotiations were due to start in 1999, which they did with the
Ministerial Conference in Seattle at the beginning of December. That the conference ended with a
complete failure does not mean an end of the process. Practical work started at working group
level and very soon it became clear that there is a strong and continued pressure on the EU from
the United States and the Cairns Group (a group of countries interested in agricultural exports) to
further reduce and in the long-run eliminate export subsidies to reduce the level of support and to
increase market access.
The EU was partially successful in introducing the concept of multifunctional agriculture also
called the European model of farming. It emphasizes the functions of agriculture in addition to
food production such as preserving the cultural landscape and contributing to the economic and
social viability of rural areas. In the beginning it was strongly rejected by the Cairns Group who
suspected a new justification for subsidies but finally it was at least accepted to include non-trade
concerns into the negotiations.   
Another important reason for having a critical view on the CAP and for looking for more options
is the eastward enlargement of the EU
23. As in previous enlargements the accession countries
will have to accept the „acquis communautaire“. If this includes the CAP in its present form,
additional surpluses of some major agricultural products would be the result. To dispose of these
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Wissenschaft, Heft 458, Bonn 1997.surpluses on the world market would be difficult because of the restrictions on subsidised exports
resulting from  the Uruguay-Round. The permitted quantities that the accession countries will add
to those of the present EU are small in relation to their production potential
24. Additional export
restitutions require additional financial resources thus opening the question whether the financial
ceilings that were part of the Berlin decisions would be sufficient to allow the accession of the
Central and Eastern European Countries.  To avoid increasing problems of surplus disposal a
strict application of supply controls might become necessary. In the case of sugar and milk the
debate on the quotas to be allocated to the accession countries has already started. These
countries demand quotas that take into the account their production potential on the basis of
historical levels of production before the collapse of the socialist system, whereas the EU tries to
orientate the quotas on the much lower present production. Most controversial is the issue of
direct payments. Whereas the EU argues that these payment are nothing else than compensations
for price cuts as part of the 1992 CAP reform and the Agenda 2000 and therefore not applicable
to the accession countries, these countries argue that they have become an essential element of
the CAP and can therefore not be denied to the accession countries. They violently reject what
they call second-class citizenship. In order to facilitate eastward enlargement one has to explore
whether a different mix of policy measures within a revised CAP is more appropriate
25.
8. How to change the CAP in order to respond to the new challenges? 
From price support to market stabilisation
Art. 39 of the Treaty of Rome mentions market stabilisation as one of the objectives of the CAP,
which means protection of producers (and consumers) against overly and unnecessary price
fluctuations. In the course of time this has become price support, which means that producer
prices were fixed above equilibrium prices and interventions and export restitutions were used to
enforce the politically decided prices. Price support was the most important means to achieve
farm income goals, which became more and more costly and less efficient. With the CAP reform
of 1992 direct payments were introduced as a more efficient means to influence farm incomes
and price support was decreased. The Agenda 2000 was a second step in the same direction.
There is certainly scope for further steps. If the WTO negotiations lead to further restrictions and
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Agricultural and Rural Policy for Europe.........p.24.in the long run the elimination of export subsidies, import tariffs will become the only instrument
to defend the level of internal prices. For commodities that EU farmers cannot produce at the
world market price the quantity produced can no longer exceed domestic consumption and the
internal price will be determined by the equilibrium between supply and demand, assuming that
for such commodities tariffs will be set at a level that limits imports to minimum market access.
Market interventions will have to be strictly limited to stabilisation. Farmers will be under the
pressure to increase productivity of production. Food prices will decline. Food safety and
environmental aspects will be taken care of by regulations to the extent necessary without
jeopardizing competitiveness.  For the support of farm incomes other measures will have to be
used. 
The future role of compensation payments 
A crucial question of the evolution of the CAP is that of the future scope and role of the
compensation payments, the central elements of the reform of 1992 and the Agenda 2000.
Evidently they will have to be maintained for some time for the reason of protection of
confidence. Farmers have made decisions, for example investment decisions, confident that the
economic environment determined by policy parameters will continue for a foreseeable future,
and it would therefore be unfair to suddenly expose them to the effects of drastic policy changes.
The validity of this argument has, however, a time limit; it cannot last forever. The longer the
policy change took place back in history, the more difficult it becomes to justify compensation
payments that have the only justification to compensate farmers for the income losses originating
from price cuts as a result of policy change. There is therefore a tendency to use cross compliance
and modulation to make compensation payments more acceptable.
From a logical point of view it seems, however, better to consider compensation payments and
payments to farmers for other services, such as maintaining the cultural landscape and
contributing to the viability of rural areas, as two different instruments
26. Instead of linking
compensation payments for price cuts to environmental conditions, which was not the case when
they were introduced, a clear distinction should be made between compensation payments strictu
sensu and payments for other services. The first ones should be phased out over a specified
period of time in a clearly defined manner, the second ones should be phased in by broadening
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regard to the eastward enlargement it may be acceptable for the accession countries to see
farmers in the present EU receiving compensation payments for a limited time and in decreasing
order of magnitude knowing that they fully participate in all programmes aiming at
environmental protection and rural development.                  
Strengthening of the „Second Pillar“
As described earlier in this paper rural development was an integral part of the CAP from the
very beginning and environmental policy became one of its components when negative impacts
of highly intensive farming and the need to maintain the countryside and the rural environment
became obvious. In the course of time both components gained more and more importance.
Functions of agriculture in addition to food production are sometimes even more important than
food production itself
27. The Agenda 2000 brought these two elements together in the Regulation
on Support for Rural Development. The concept, of offering a broad list of optional measures to
national or regional authorities, thus giving them the possibility to choose and to design tailor-
made programmes for specific regions according to their priorities and their willingness to co-
finance such programmes (outside objective-1-regions at a rate of 50 p.c.)  corresponds to the
principle of subsidiarity. If unnecessary bureaucracy in the decision making process can be
avoided it is difficult to see a need for re-nationalisation, if one accepts the principle that a
common framework is necessary to avoid distortion of competition and to execute financial
solidarity with less wealthy countries and regions within the Community. The latter is of
particular importance for the Central and Eastern European Countries. These countries certainly
have a need for rural development and environment protection but their own budgets will not
allow financing the necessary measures. Since probably many of their rural areas will be
classified as objective-1-regions the respective measures will be co financed by the EU at a rate
of 75 p.c. Channelling funds into development measures will be more appropriate than paying
farmers compensation payments on the basis of historical production.
Concerning the evolution of the CAP the most appropriate way would be to strengthen the
“second pillar“. Such strategy can make a major contribution to the development of rural areas,
for which there is a real need in many European countries. The multifunctionality of agriculture
can be better taken into account by measures of the „second pillar“ than by purely protectivemeasures. Taking into account that some measures, which were formerly, financed by the
Guidance Section of the EAGGF the yearly amount available of 4.3 billion Euro  (30 billion Euro
for the period 2000-2006) is practically the same as it was in the period 1994-1999 for the
measures that are now part of the Regulation on Support for Rural Development. The narrow
financial restrictions do not correspond to the importance of the task. Financial resources that will
be released by a reduction of price support  - which will probably be unavoidable under the
influence of the WTO  - should be used to increase the financial basis. The same should be done
with financial resources resulting from reductions of compensation payments
28.
Measures of animal welfare can easily be included in the concept if the society so wishes and is
prepared to pay for it. Experience shows that the consumer’s willingness to pay higher prices for
commodities produced under higher animal welfare standards does not bring about the results
that society wishes.  Organic farming is already part of the concept. Specific promotion of this
type of farming should, however, take place with great care. Basically production should be
driven by demand. If supply increases faster than demand because of promotion, prices may
collapse to the detriment of farmers who already changed to organic farming. Correct labelling
should give the consumer the choice between types of food produced by different practices. Food
safety has to be guaranteed by adequate standards. Compliance with the standards has to be
checked by controls. The perception that food quality is the direct result of farming practices or of
farm size does not stand scientific tests. Attempts to maintain a farm structure primarily based on
small farms or to split-up larger units into small farms, and to put an upper limit on production
intensity coupled with price support may be counterproductive. Most probably they will not be
successful because isolation from the world market will not be tolerated by the WTO. If
nevertheless efforts are made in that direction, for example by offering compensations to WTO
members whose export interests will be violated, one has to aware that it would mean strengthen
the „first pillar“ to the detriment of the „second pillar“, the contrary of what a long-term solution
requires.
References:            
                                                                                                                                                        
27 Akademie für Raumforschung und Landesplanung: Regional Aspects..........
28 European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Social Affairs: Towards a Common
Agricultural and Rural Policy for Europe.......p.55.Akademie für Raumforschung und Landesplanung: Regional Aspects of Common
Agricultural Policy: New Roles for Rural Areas, Hannover 1996
Bundesministerium für Verbraucherschutz, Ernährung und Landwirtschaft: Agrarbericht der
Bundesregierung 2001.
Deutscher Bauernverband: Situationsbericht 2000.
European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs: Towards a
Common Agricultural and Rural Policy for Europe, European Economy, Reports and Studies
No.5, 1997. 
European Commission, Directorate General for Agriculture: Rural Developments, CAP 2000,
Working Document, 1997.
European Commission, Directorate for Agriculture (DG VI):  Agricultural Situation and
Prospects in the Central and Eastern European Countries, Summary Report, Brussels 1998.
EU-Kommission: „ Agenda 2000. Eine stärkere und erweiterte Union“, Bulletin der EU,
Beilage 5, 1997.
Commission of the European Communities: The Future of Rural Society, Brussels 1988.
Kirschke, D., Hagedorn, K., Odening, M., Witzke, H. von: Optionen für die
Weiterentwicklung der EU-Agrarpolitik, Kiel 1997.
Schramek, J., Biehl, D., Buller, H., Wilson, G. (Eds.): Implementation and Effectiveness of
Agri-environmental Schemes Established under Regulating 2078/92, Final Consolidated
Report, Frankfurt, June 1999. 
Seidel, M.: Rückführung der Landwirtschaftspolitiken in die Verantwortung der
Mitgliedstaaten? Rechts- und Verfassungsfragen des Gemeinschaftsrechts, Zentrum für
Europäische Integrationsforschung, Policy Paper B00-17, Bonn 2000.
Tangermann, S.: Implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture: Issues
and Prospects, Journal of Agricultural Economics 47, No. 3, 1996, pp.315-337.
Tangermann, S. and Josling, T.: Pre-accession agricultural policies for central europe and the
European Union, report prepared for the European Commission, DG I, Brussels 1994.
v.Urff, W.: Zur Weiterentwicklung der EU-Agrarpolitik. Synopse und Bewertung von
Reformvorschlägen. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung , Interne Studie Nr.150/1997
v.Urff, W.: Agrar- und Fischereipolitik, in: Weidenfeld, W. / Wessels,W.(Hrsg.): Jahrbuch
der Europäischen Integration 1998/1999, pp.125-134.
v.Urff, W.: Agrarmarkt und Struktur des ländlichen Raumes in Europa, in: Weidenfeld, W.
(Hrsg): Europa-Handbuch , Gütersloh 1999, pp. 445-461.
Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundenministerium für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und
Forsten: Die Entwicklung der Landwirtschaft in Mitteleuropa und mögliche Folgen für die
Agrarpolitik in der EU, Schriftenreihe des Bundesministeriums für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft
unf Forsten, Reihe A: Angewandte Wissenschaft, Heft 458, Bonn 1997.
Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und
Forsten: Zur Weiterentwicklung der EU-Agrarreform, Schriftenreihe des Bundesministeriumsfür Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten, Reihe A: Angewandte Wissenschaft, Heft 459,
Bonn 1997.    2008
B01-08 Euro-Diplomatie durch gemeinsame „Wirtschaftsregierung“ Martin Seidel
2007
B03-07 Löhne und Steuern im Systemwettbewerb der Mitgliedstaaten
der Europäischen Union
Martin Seidel
B02-07 Konsolidierung und Reform der Europäischen Union Martin Seidel
B01-07 The Ratiﬁcation of European Treaties - Legal and Constitutio-
nal Basis of a European Referendum.
Martin Seidel
2006
B03-06 Financial Frictions, Capital Reallocation, and Aggregate Fluc-
tuations
Jürgen von Hagen, Haiping Zhang
B02-06 Financial Openness and Macroeconomic Volatility Jürgen von Hagen, Haiping Zhang
B01-06 A Welfare Analysis of Capital Account Liberalization Jürgen von Hagen, Haiping Zhang
2005
B11-05 Das Kompetenz- und Entscheidungssystem des Vertrages von
Rom im Wandel seiner Funktion und Verfassung
Martin Seidel
B10-05 Die Schutzklauseln der Beitrittsverträge Martin Seidel
B09-05 Measuring Tax Burdens in Europe Guntram B. Wolﬀ
B08-05 Remittances as Investment in the Absence of Altruism Gabriel González-König
B07-05 Economic Integration in a Multicone World? Christian Volpe Martincus, Jenni-
fer Pédussel Wu
B06-05 Banking Sector (Under?)Development in Central and Eastern
Europe
Jürgen von Hagen, Valeriya Din-
ger
B05-05 Regulatory Standards Can Lead to Predation Stefan Lutz
B04-05 Währungspolitik als Sozialpolitik Martin Seidel
B03-05 Public Education in an Integrated Europe: Studying to Migrate
and Teaching to Stay?
Panu Poutvaara
B02-05 Voice of the Diaspora: An Analysis of Migrant Voting Behavior Jan Fidrmuc, Orla Doyle
B01-05 Macroeconomic Adjustment in the New EU Member States Jürgen von Hagen, Iulia Traistaru
2004
B33-04 The Eﬀects of Transition and Political Instability On Foreign
Direct Investment Inﬂows: Central Europe and the Balkans
Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan, Ta-
ner M. Yigit
B32-04 The Choice of Exchange Rate Regimes in Developing Coun-
tries: A Mulitnominal Panal Analysis
Jürgen von Hagen, Jizhong Zhou
B31-04 Fear of Floating and Fear of Pegging: An Empirical Anaysis of
De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes in Developing Countries
Jürgen von Hagen, Jizhong Zhou
B30-04 Der Vollzug von Gemeinschaftsrecht über die Mitgliedstaaten
und seine Rolle für die EU und den Beitrittsprozess
Martin Seidel
B29-04 Deutschlands Wirtschaft, seine Schulden und die Unzulänglich-
keiten der einheitlichen Geldpolitik im Eurosystem
Dieter Spethmann, Otto Steiger
B28-04 Fiscal Crises in U.S. Cities: Structural and Non-structural Cau-
ses
Guntram B. Wolﬀ
B27-04 Firm Performance and Privatization in Ukraine Galyna Grygorenko, Stefan Lutz
B26-04 Analyzing Trade Opening in Ukraine: Eﬀects of a Customs Uni-
on with the EU
Oksana Harbuzyuk, Stefan Lutz
B25-04 Exchange Rate Risk and Convergence to the Euro Lucjan T. Orlowski
B24-04 The Endogeneity of Money and the Eurosystem Otto Steiger
B23-04 Which Lender of Last Resort for the Eurosystem? Otto Steiger
B22-04 Non-Discretonary Monetary Policy: The Answer for Transition
Economies?
Elham-Maﬁ Kreft, Steven F. Kreft
B21-04 The Eﬀectiveness of Subsidies Revisited: Accounting for Wage
and Employment Eﬀects in Business R+D
Volker Reinthaler, Guntram B.
Wolﬀ
B20-04 Money Market Pressure and the Determinants of Banking Cri-
ses
Jürgen von Hagen, Tai-kuang Ho
B19-04 Die Stellung der Europäischen Zentralbank nach dem Verfas-
sungsvertrag
Martin SeidelB18-04 Transmission Channels of Business Cycles Synchronization in
an Enlarged EMU
Iulia Traistaru
B17-04 Foreign Exchange Regime, the Real Exchange Rate and Current
Account Sustainability: The Case of Turkey
Sübidey Togan, Hasan Ersel
B16-04 Does It Matter Where Immigrants Work? Traded Goods, Non-
traded Goods, and Sector Speciﬁc Employment
Harry P. Bowen, Jennifer Pédussel
Wu
B15-04 Do Economic Integration and Fiscal Competition Help to Ex-
plain Local Patterns?
Christian Volpe Martincus
B14-04 Euro Adoption and Maastricht Criteria: Rules or Discretion? Jiri Jonas
B13-04 The Role of Electoral and Party Systems in the Development of
Fiscal Institutions in the Central and Eastern European Coun-
tries
Sami Yläoutinen
B12-04 Measuring and Explaining Levels of Regional Economic Inte-
gration
Jennifer Pédussel Wu
B11-04 Economic Integration and Location of Manufacturing Activi-
ties: Evidence from MERCOSUR
Pablo Sanguinetti, Iulia Traistaru,
Christian Volpe Martincus
B10-04 Economic Integration and Industry Location in Transition
Countries
Laura Resmini
B09-04 Testing Creditor Moral Hazard in Souvereign Bond Markets: A
Uniﬁed Theoretical Approach and Empirical Evidence
Ayse Y. Evrensel, Ali M. Kutan
B08-04 European Integration, Productivity Growth and Real Conver-
gence
Taner M. Yigit, Ali M. Kutan
B07-04 The Contribution of Income, Social Capital, and Institutions to
Human Well-being in Africa
Mina Baliamoune-Lutz, Stefan H.
Lutz
B06-04 Rural Urban Inequality in Africa: A Panel Study of the Eﬀects
of Trade Liberalization and Financial Deepening
Mina Baliamoune-Lutz, Stefan H.
Lutz
B05-04 Money Rules for the Eurozone Candidate Countries Lucjan T. Orlowski
B04-04 Who is in Favor of Enlargement? Determinants of Support for
EU Membership in the Candidate Countries’ Referenda
Orla Doyle, Jan Fidrmuc
B03-04 Over- and Underbidding in Central Bank Open Market Opera-
tions Conducted as Fixed Rate Tender
Ulrich Bindseil
B02-04 Total Factor Productivity and Economic Freedom Implications
for EU Enlargement
Ronald L. Moomaw, Euy Seok
Yang
B01-04 Die neuen Schutzklauseln der Artikel 38 und 39 des Bei-
trittsvertrages: Schutz der alten Mitgliedstaaten vor Störungen
durch die neuen Mitgliedstaaten
Martin Seidel
2003
B29-03 Macroeconomic Implications of Low Inﬂation in the Euro Area Jürgen von Hagen, Boris Hofmann
B28-03 The Eﬀects of Transition and Political Instability on Foreign
Direct Investment: Central Europe and the Balkans
Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan, Ta-
ner M. Yigit
B27-03 The Performance of the Euribor Futures Market: Eﬃciency and
the Impact of ECB Policy Announcements (Electronic Version
of International Finance)
Kerstin Bernoth, Juergen von Ha-
gen
B26-03 Souvereign Risk Premia in the European Government Bond
Market (überarbeitete Version zum Herunterladen)
Kerstin Bernoth, Juergen von Ha-
gen, Ludger Schulknecht
B25-03 How Flexible are Wages in EU Accession Countries? Anna Iara, Iulia Traistaru
B24-03 Monetary Policy Reaction Functions: ECB versus Bundesbank Bernd Hayo, Boris Hofmann
B23-03 Economic Integration and Manufacturing Concentration Pat-
terns: Evidence from Mercosur
Iulia Traistaru, Christian Volpe
Martincus
B22-03 Reformzwänge innerhalb der EU angesichts der Osterweiterung Martin Seidel
B21-03 Reputation Flows: Contractual Disputes and the Channels for
Inter-Firm Communication
William Pyle
B20-03 Urban Primacy, Gigantism, and International Trade: Evidence
from Asia and the Americas
Ronald L. Moomaw, Mohammed
A. Alwosabi
B19-03 An Empirical Analysis of Competing Explanations of Urban Pri-
macy Evidence from Asia and the Americas
Ronald L. Moomaw, Mohammed
A. AlwosabiB18-03 The Eﬀects of Regional and Industry-Wide FDI Spillovers on
Export of Ukrainian Firms
Stefan H. Lutz, Oleksandr Talave-
ra, Sang-Min Park
B17-03 Determinants of Inter-Regional Migration in the Baltic States Mihails Hazans
B16-03 South-East Europe: Economic Performance, Perspectives, and
Policy Challenges
Iulia Traistaru, Jürgen von Hagen
B15-03 Employed and Unemployed Search: The Marginal Willingness
to Pay for Attributes in Lithuania, the US and the Netherlands
Jos van Ommeren, Mihails Hazans
B14-03 FCIs and Economic Activity: Some International Evidence Charles Goodhart, Boris Hofmann
B13-03 The IS Curve and the Transmission of Monetary Policy: Is there
a Puzzle?
Charles Goodhart, Boris Hofmann
B12-03 What Makes Regions in Eastern Europe Catching Up? The
Role of Foreign Investment, Human Resources, and Geography
Gabriele Tondl, Goran Vuksic
B11-03 Die Weisungs- und Herrschaftsmacht der Europäischen Zen-
tralbank im europäischen System der Zentralbanken - eine
rechtliche Analyse
Martin Seidel
B10-03 Foreign Direct Investment and Perceptions of Vulnerability to
Foreign Exchange Crises: Evidence from Transition Economies
Josef C. Brada, Vladimír Tomsík
B09-03 The European Central Bank and the Eurosystem: An Analy-
sis of the Missing Central Monetary Institution in European
Monetary Union
Gunnar Heinsohn, Otto Steiger
B08-03 The Determination of Capital Controls: Which Role Do Ex-
change Rate Regimes Play?
Jürgen von Hagen, Jizhong Zhou
B07-03 Nach Nizza und Stockholm: Stand des Binnenmarktes und
Prioritäten für die Zukunft
Martin Seidel
B06-03 Fiscal Discipline and Growth in Euroland. Experiences with the
Stability and Growth Pact
Jürgen von Hagen
B05-03 Reconsidering the Evidence: Are Eurozone Business Cycles
Converging?
Michael Massmann, James Mit-
chell
B04-03 Do Ukrainian Firms Beneﬁt from FDI? Stefan H. Lutz, Oleksandr Talave-
ra
B03-03 Europäische Steuerkoordination und die Schweiz Stefan H. Lutz
B02-03 Commuting in the Baltic States: Patterns, Determinants, and
Gains
Mihails Hazans
B01-03 Die Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion im rechtlichen und poli-
tischen Gefüge der Europäischen Union
Martin Seidel
2002
B30-02 An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Ass-
urance
Marcus Hagedorn, Ashok Kaul,
Tim Mennel
B29B-02 Trade Agreements as Self-protection Jennifer Pédussel Wu
B29A-02 Growth and Business Cycles with Imperfect Credit Markets Debajyoti Chakrabarty
B28-02 Inequality, Politics and Economic Growth Debajyoti Chakrabarty
B27-02 Poverty Traps and Growth in a Model of Endogenous Time
Preference
Debajyoti Chakrabarty
B26-02 Monetary Convergence and Risk Premiums in the EU Candi-
date Countries
Lucjan T. Orlowski
B25-02 Trade Policy: Institutional Vs. Economic Factors Stefan Lutz
B24-02 The Eﬀects of Quotas on Vertical Intra-industry Trade Stefan Lutz
B23-02 Legal Aspects of European Economic and Monetary Union Martin Seidel
B22-02 Der Staat als Lender of Last Resort - oder: Die Achillesverse
des Eurosystems
Otto Steiger
B21-02 Nominal and Real Stochastic Convergence Within the Tran-
sition Economies and to the European Union: Evidence from
Panel Data
Ali M. Kutan, Taner M. Yigit
B20-02 The Impact of News, Oil Prices, and International Spillovers
on Russian Fincancial Markets
Bernd Hayo, Ali M. KutanB19-02 East Germany: Transition with Uniﬁcation, Experiments and
Experiences
Jürgen von Hagen, Rolf R.
Strauch, Guntram B. Wolﬀ
B18-02 Regional Specialization and Employment Dynamics in Transi-
tion Countries
Iulia Traistaru, Guntram B. Wolﬀ
B17-02 Specialization and Growth Patterns in Border Regions of Ac-
cession Countries
Laura Resmini
B16-02 Regional Specialization and Concentration of Industrial Activity
in Accession Countries
Iulia Traistaru, Peter Nijkamp, Si-
monetta Longhi
B15-02 Does Broad Money Matter for Interest Rate Policy? Matthias Brückner, Andreas Scha-
ber
B14-02 The Long and Short of It: Global Liberalization, Poverty and
Inequality
Christian E. Weller, Adam Hersch
B13-02 De Facto and Oﬃcial Exchange Rate Regimes in Transition
Economies
Jürgen von Hagen, Jizhong Zhou
B12-02 Argentina: The Anatomy of A Crisis Jiri Jonas
B11-02 The Eurosystem and the Art of Central Banking Gunnar Heinsohn, Otto Steiger
B10-02 National Origins of European Law: Towards an Autonomous
System of European Law?
Martin Seidel
B09-02 Monetary Policy in the Euro Area - Lessons from the First Years Volker Clausen, Bernd Hayo
B08-02 Has the Link Between the Spot and Forward Exchange Rates
Broken Down? Evidence From Rolling Cointegration Tests
Ali M. Kutan, Su Zhou
B07-02 Perspektiven der Erweiterung der Europäischen Union Martin Seidel
B06-02 Is There Asymmetry in Forward Exchange Rate Bias? Multi-
Country Evidence
Su Zhou, Ali M. Kutan
B05-02 Real and Monetary Convergence Within the European Union
and Between the European Union and Candidate Countries: A
Rolling Cointegration Approach
Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan, Su
Zhou
B04-02 Asymmetric Monetary Policy Eﬀects in EMU Volker Clausen, Bernd Hayo
B03-02 The Choice of Exchange Rate Regimes: An Empirical Analysis
for Transition Economies
Jürgen von Hagen, Jizhong Zhou
B02-02 The Euro System and the Federal Reserve System Compared:
Facts and Challenges
Karlheinz Ruckriegel, Franz Seitz
B01-02 Does Inﬂation Targeting Matter? Manfred J. M. Neumann, Jürgen
von Hagen
2001
B29-01 Is Kazakhstan Vulnerable to the Dutch Disease? Karlygash Kuralbayeva, Ali M. Ku-
tan, Michael L. Wyzan
B28-01 Political Economy of the Nice Treaty: Rebalancing the EU
Council. The Future of European Agricultural Policies
Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B27-01 Investor Panic, IMF Actions, and Emerging Stock Market Re-
turns and Volatility: A Panel Investigation
Bernd Hayo, Ali M. Kutan
B26-01 Regional Eﬀects of Terrorism on Tourism: Evidence from Three
Mediterranean Countries
Konstantinos Drakos, Ali M. Ku-
tan
B25-01 Monetary Convergence of the EU Candidates to the Euro: A
Theoretical Framework and Policy Implications
Lucjan T. Orlowski
B24-01 Disintegration and Trade Jarko and Jan Fidrmuc
B23-01 Migration and Adjustment to Shocks in Transition Economies Jan Fidrmuc
B22-01 Strategic Delegation and International Capital Taxation Matthias Brückner
B21-01 Balkan and Mediterranean Candidates for European Union
Membership: The Convergence of Their Monetary Policy With
That of the Europaen Central Bank
Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan
B20-01 An Empirical Inquiry of the Eﬃciency of Intergovernmental
Transfers for Water Projects Based on the WRDA Data
Anna Rubinchik-Pessach
B19-01 Detrending and the Money-Output Link: International Evi-
dence
R.W. Hafer, Ali M. KutanB18-01 Monetary Policy in Unknown Territory. The European Central
Bank in the Early Years
Jürgen von Hagen, Matthias
Brückner
B17-01 Executive Authority, the Personal Vote, and Budget Discipline
in Latin American and Carribean Countries
Mark Hallerberg, Patrick Marier
B16-01 Sources of Inﬂation and Output Fluctuations in Poland and
Hungary: Implications for Full Membership in the European
Union
Selahattin Dibooglu, Ali M. Kutan
B15-01 Programs Without Alternative: Public Pensions in the OECD Christian E. Weller
B14-01 Formal Fiscal Restraints and Budget Processes As Solutions to
a Deﬁcit and Spending Bias in Public Finances - U.S. Experi-
ence and Possible Lessons for EMU
Rolf R. Strauch, Jürgen von Hagen
B13-01 German Public Finances: Recent Experiences and Future Chal-
lenges
Jürgen von Hagen, Rolf R. Strauch
B12-01 The Impact of Eastern Enlargement On EU-Labour Markets.
Pensions Reform Between Economic and Political Problems
Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B11-01 Inﬂationary Performance in a Monetary Union With Large Wa-
ge Setters
Lilia Cavallar
B10-01 Integration of the Baltic States into the EU and Institutions
of Fiscal Convergence: A Critical Evaluation of Key Issues and
Empirical Evidence
Ali M. Kutan, Niina Pautola-Mol
B09-01 Democracy in Transition Economies: Grease or Sand in the
Wheels of Growth?
Jan Fidrmuc
B08-01 The Functioning of Economic Policy Coordination Jürgen von Hagen, Susanne
Mundschenk
B07-01 The Convergence of Monetary Policy Between Candidate
Countries and the European Union
Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan
B06-01 Opposites Attract: The Case of Greek and Turkish Financial
Markets
Konstantinos Drakos, Ali M. Ku-
tan
B05-01 Trade Rules and Global Governance: A Long Term Agenda.
The Future of Banking.
Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B04-01 The Determination of Unemployment Beneﬁts Rafael di Tella, Robert J. Mac-
Culloch
B03-01 Preferences Over Inﬂation and Unemployment: Evidence from
Surveys of Happiness
Rafael di Tella, Robert J. Mac-
Culloch, Andrew J. Oswald
B02-01 The Konstanz Seminar on Monetary Theory and Policy at Thir-
ty
Michele Fratianni, Jürgen von Ha-
gen
B01-01 Divided Boards: Partisanship Through Delegated Monetary Po-
licy
Etienne Farvaque, Gael Lagadec
2000
B20-00 Breakin-up a Nation, From the Inside Etienne Farvaque
B19-00 Income Dynamics and Stability in the Transition Process, ge-
neral Reﬂections applied to the Czech Republic
Jens Hölscher
B18-00 Budget Processes: Theory and Experimental Evidence Karl-Martin Ehrhart, Roy Gardner,
Jürgen von Hagen, Claudia Keser
B17-00 Rückführung der Landwirtschaftspolitik in die Verantwortung
der Mitgliedsstaaten? - Rechts- und Verfassungsfragen des Ge-
meinschaftsrechts
Martin Seidel
B16-00 The European Central Bank: Independence and Accountability Christa Randzio-Plath, Tomasso
Padoa-Schioppa
B15-00 Regional Risk Sharing and Redistribution in the German Fede-
ration
Jürgen von Hagen, Ralf Hepp
B14-00 Sources of Real Exchange Rate Fluctuations in Transition Eco-
nomies: The Case of Poland and Hungary
Selahattin Dibooglu, Ali M. Kutan
B13-00 Back to the Future: The Growth Prospects of Transition Eco-
nomies Reconsidered
Nauro F. CamposB12-00 Rechtsetzung und Rechtsangleichung als Folge der Einheitli-
chen Europäischen Währung
Martin Seidel
B11-00 A Dynamic Approach to Inﬂation Targeting in Transition Eco-
nomies
Lucjan T. Orlowski
B10-00 The Importance of Domestic Political Institutions: Why and
How Belgium Qualiﬁed for EMU
Marc Hallerberg
B09-00 Rational Institutions Yield Hysteresis Rafael Di Tella, Robert Mac-
Culloch
B08-00 The Eﬀectiveness of Self-Protection Policies for Safeguarding
Emerging Market Economies from Crises
Kenneth Kletzer
B07-00 Financial Supervision and Policy Coordination in The EMU Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B06-00 The Demand for Money in Austria Bernd Hayo
B05-00 Liberalization, Democracy and Economic Performance during
Transition
Jan Fidrmuc
B04-00 A New Political Culture in The EU - Democratic Accountability
of the ECB
Christa Randzio-Plath
B03-00 Integration, Disintegration and Trade in Europe: Evolution of
Trade Relations during the 1990’s
Jarko Fidrmuc, Jan Fidrmuc
B02-00 Inﬂation Bias and Productivity Shocks in Transition Economies:
The Case of the Czech Republic
Josef C. Barda, Arthur E. King, Ali
M. Kutan
B01-00 Monetary Union and Fiscal Federalism Kenneth Kletzer, Jürgen von Ha-
gen
1999
B26-99 Skills, Labour Costs, and Vertically Diﬀerentiated Industries: A
General Equilibrium Analysis
Stefan Lutz, Alessandro Turrini
B25-99 Micro and Macro Determinants of Public Support for Market
Reforms in Eastern Europe
Bernd Hayo
B24-99 What Makes a Revolution? Robert MacCulloch
B23-99 Informal Family Insurance and the Design of the Welfare State Rafael Di Tella, Robert Mac-
Culloch
B22-99 Partisan Social Happiness Rafael Di Tella, Robert Mac-
Culloch
B21-99 The End of Moderate Inﬂation in Three Transition Economies? Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan
B20-99 Subnational Government Bailouts in Germany Helmut Seitz
B19-99 The Evolution of Monetary Policy in Transition Economies Ali M. Kutan, Josef C. Brada
B18-99 Why are Eastern Europe’s Banks not failing when everybody
else’s are?
Christian E. Weller, Bernard Mor-
zuch
B17-99 Stability of Monetary Unions: Lessons from the Break-Up of
Czechoslovakia
Jan Fidrmuc, Julius Horvath and
Jarko Fidrmuc
B16-99 Multinational Banks and Development Finance Christian E.Weller and Mark J.
Scher
B15-99 Financial Crises after Financial Liberalization: Exceptional Cir-
cumstances or Structural Weakness?
Christian E. Weller
B14-99 Industry Eﬀects of Monetary Policy in Germany Bernd Hayo and Birgit Uhlenbrock
B13-99 Fiancial Fragility or What Went Right and What Could Go
Wrong in Central European Banking?
Christian E. Weller and Jürgen von
Hagen
B12 -99 Size Distortions of Tests of the Null Hypothesis of Stationarity:
Evidence and Implications for Applied Work
Mehmet Caner and Lutz Kilian
B11-99 Financial Supervision and Policy Coordination in the EMU Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B10-99 Financial Liberalization, Multinational Banks and Credit Sup-
ply: The Case of Poland
Christian Weller
B09-99 Monetary Policy, Parameter Uncertainty and Optimal Learning Volker Wieland
B08-99 The Connection between more Multinational Banks and less
Real Credit in Transition Economies
Christian WellerB07-99 Comovement and Catch-up in Productivity across Sectors: Evi-
dence from the OECD
Christopher M. Cornwell and Jens-
Uwe Wächter
B06-99 Productivity Convergence and Economic Growth: A Frontier
Production Function Approach
Christopher M. Cornwell and Jens-
Uwe Wächter
B05-99 Tumbling Giant: Germany‘s Experience with the Maastricht
Fiscal Criteria
Jürgen von Hagen and Rolf
Strauch
B04-99 The Finance-Investment Link in a Transition Economy: Evi-
dence for Poland from Panel Data
Christian Weller
B03-99 The Macroeconomics of Happiness Rafael Di Tella, Robert Mac-
Culloch and Andrew J. Oswald
B02-99 The Consequences of Labour Market Flexibility: Panel Evidence
Based on Survey Data
Rafael Di Tella and Robert Mac-
Culloch
B01-99 The Excess Volatility of Foreign Exchange Rates: Statistical
Puzzle or Theoretical Artifact?
Robert B.H. Hauswald
1998
B16-98 Labour Market + Tax Policy in the EMU Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B15-98 Can Taxing Foreign Competition Harm the Domestic Industry? Stefan Lutz
B14-98 Free Trade and Arms Races: Some Thoughts Regarding EU-
Russian Trade
Rafael Reuveny and John Maxwell
B13-98 Fiscal Policy and Intranational Risk-Sharing Jürgen von Hagen
B12-98 Price Stability and Monetary Policy Eﬀectiveness when Nomi-
nal Interest Rates are Bounded at Zero
Athanasios Orphanides and Volker
Wieland
B11A-98 Die Bewertung der "dauerhaft tragbaren öﬀentlichen Finanz-
lage"der EU Mitgliedstaaten beim Übergang zur dritten Stufe
der EWWU
Rolf Strauch
B11-98 Exchange Rate Regimes in the Transition Economies: Case Stu-
dy of the Czech Republic: 1990-1997
Julius Horvath and Jiri Jonas
B10-98 Der Wettbewerb der Rechts- und politischen Systeme in der
Europäischen Union
Martin Seidel
B09-98 U.S. Monetary Policy and Monetary Policy and the ESCB Robert L. Hetzel
B08-98 Money-Output Granger Causality Revisited: An Empirical Ana-
lysis of EU Countries (überarbeitete Version zum Herunterla-
den)
Bernd Hayo
B07-98 Designing Voluntary Environmental Agreements in Europe: So-
me Lessons from the U.S. EPA’s 33/50 Program
John W. Maxwell
B06-98 Monetary Union, Asymmetric Productivity Shocks and Fiscal
Insurance: an Analytical Discussion of Welfare Issues
Kenneth Kletzer
B05-98 Estimating a European Demand for Money (überarbeitete Ver-
sion zum Herunterladen)
Bernd Hayo
B04-98 The EMU’s Exchange Rate Policy Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B03-98 Central Bank Policy in a More Perfect Financial System Jürgen von Hagen / Ingo Fender
B02-98 Trade with Low-Wage Countries and Wage Inequality Jaleel Ahmad
B01-98 Budgeting Institutions for Aggregate Fiscal Discipline Jürgen von Hagen
1997
B04-97 Macroeconomic Stabilization with a Common Currency: Does
European Monetary Uniﬁcation Create a Need for Fiscal Ins-
urance or Federalism?
Kenneth Kletzer
B-03-97 Liberalising European Markets for Energy and Telecommunica-
tions: Some Lessons from the US Electric Utility Industry
Tom Lyon / John Mayo
B02-97 Employment and EMU Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B01-97 A Stability Pact for Europe (a Forum organized by ZEI)ISSN 1436 - 6053
Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung
Center for European Integration Studies
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn
Walter-Flex-Strasse 3 Tel.: +49-228-73-1732
D-53113 Bonn Fax: +49-228-73-1809
Germany www.zei.de